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ABSTRACT

The purpose o f this thesis is to redress a major aspect that has been
overlooked in studies made of Early America: the significance that Rumor played in
the everyday lives of Indians. Rumor, which has been defined throughout this thesis
as current unsubstantiated information, played a fundamental role in Cherokee
communities. Essentially rumor gets right to the heart of Indian culture. In exploring
how Indians viewed rumor, historians gain insight into how Indians perceived
themselves and those around them. One of the challenges of this thesis has been to
move beyond the literate universe and instead imagine what it was like living in a
community where enunciated words were the primary means of communication. The
study of rumor reveals the importance of memory and goes some way to explain why
the elderly were revered.
One of the major problems that have been tackled within the following
chapters is how to trace rumor and to distinguish fact from fiction. Indians managed
to sift through rumors, deciphering between those that held some element of truth and
others that were purely gossip-driven. Establishing the truth could be a timeconsuming process, particularly in the event of uneven terrain and dense woodlands.
Rumors ran rife during times of uncertainty and even amongst groups who had
established trust. It is clear that the forces driving rumors were often as diverse as the
rumors themselves. Often rumor sped through the settlements, whipping up anxiety
and uneasiness as it hurtled past.
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THE DISSEMINATION OF RUMOR AMONG THE CHEROKEES AND
THEIR NEIGHBORS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Introduction

“My tongue is my pen and my mouth my paper.” 1

Although rumor is a fascinating area of study for historians of early America,
it is one that has been largely overlooked. One of the aims of this thesis to redress
this neglect by analyzing the responses of Cherokee communities to unsubstantiated
news, which they received on a frequent basis. Perhaps part of the reason that rumor
has not been the stuff of history books is because historians are wary of using general
talk or hearsay in their analysis of the past. But all evidence is slippery to a degree
and rumor, which relies upon indirect testimony, is no different in this respect.
Rumor has been defined throughout this thesis as general talk or hearsay of
doubtful accuracy.

The study of rumor is central to our understanding of early

America and thus is pertinent to study for a number of reasons. In the first instance
the information that is transmitted through rumors touches the core o f the human
experience. The stuff of rumor indicates the types of underlying issues, which were
‘Skiagunsta, an elderly tribal chief, uttered these words. Talk o f the Cherokee Indians to Governor
Glen, 15 November 1751, in William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., Colonial Records o f South Carolina:
Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, M ay 21 1750 - August 7 1 754, 2 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1958),
1:80, 164, 453. (hereafter DRIA)

2

3

pertinent to Indians and their British counterparts. The number of rumors and the
speed with which they traveled through Cherokee communities suggests that
unsubstantiated information was often convincing and thus picked up by individuals
and spread by them over communication networks. It will become clear throughout
this thesis that one of the main characteristics of persistent rumors were those that
gripped individuals and threatened their security and well-being. British threats of
the suspension of trade or the fear of impending war from hostile tribes often
provoked anxiety and alarm. By carefully tracing a rumor from its origin, one can see
the social repercussions that were sparked by the transmission of scurrilous
information.
One of the most challenging and fascinating aspects in the analysis of rumor
has been attempting to span the gaping divide that exists between literacy and orality.
Although Indians were well aware of the literate world in which the white man
corresponded, the Cherokee world was one that relied upon orality as its primary
means of communication. The analysis of rumors circulating in borderland
communities requires a leap of imagination for historians who are preconditioned by
a literate world. If one is to successfully gain a deep understanding of Cherokee
communities, it is essential to leave all that is familiar and step onto unknown
territory. It is only by casting off our literacy that we can successfully enter the mind
of the Cherokee Indian and see what he saw and attempt to understand how he
perceived his changing world.
The work of anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists has proved very
beneficial in this respect. Gordon Allport and Leo Postman set up a framework

4

around which they developed theories concerning the psychology of rumor. They
emphasized the purposive nature of rumor and how rumors served specific emotional
ends. Their research indicates that in times of crisis false reports grew virulent.2
Ralph Rosnow and Gary Fine further developed these ideas in their work and also
focused upon gossip as a medium of social interaction.

The stuff of rumor tends to

concern groups of people rather than individuals or social incidents, which is the
substance of gossip. Although rumor and gossip share the quality of being
unconfirmed, gossip tends to have more malicious effects on specific individuals than
rumor, which is more neutral in substance. An unspecified number of individuals
tend to spread rumors, whereas the unconstrained chatter of a select few usually leads
to the promulgation of gossip.4 Raymond Firth, in his anthropological case study of
the Polynesian island of Tikopia in the Western Pacific, studied the effects of rumor
in a primitive society. His analysis of this community indicated ways in which to
study the formation, incidence and social repercussions of rumor.5 Furthermore,
Walter Ong in his studies on ‘primary oral cultures’ crucially pinpointed the need to
move beyond the notion that orality is a deficient variant of a literate world.6
In addition to consulting a number of the theoretical studies that have been
carried out on rumor, it is important to understand the dynamics of Cherokee society
and therefore a number of historical works concerning the Cherokee Indians were
closely studied.

David Cockran, in his meticulous research, has illustrated the

2Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology o f Rumor (New York, 1947).
3Ralph L. Rosnow and Gary A. Fine, Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology o f Hearsay (New
York, 1976).
4Patricia M. Spacks, Gossip (New York, 1985), 3.
5Raymond Firth, “Rumor in a Primitive Society,” Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53
(1956), 122-32.
6Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing o f the Word (New York, 1982).
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importance of community life on the Cherokee-Carolina frontier and has greatly
n

benefited one’s understanding of the complexities of these diverse cultures.

Thomas

Hatley, for his part, has charted the demise in the relationship between the Cherokees
•

•

•

•

and their European neighbors using the metaphor of “dividing paths.”

8

James

Merrell’s work on the role of interpreters as cultural brokers has also proven to be
enlightening. His evidence suggests that interpreters held a dominant position in
frontier life; they were embraced and also spumed by the communities in which they
operated.9
One of the most detailed primary sources that remain of the Cherokee Indians
are what have come to be known as the “Indian Books.” 10 Before 1756 all matters
relating to Indian affairs were referred to South Carolina’s Executive Council.

The

current affairs of the kingdom were reported to the governor of the colony in the form
of letters and affidavits taken by a select group of British officers who were
responsible for collecting intelligence. These books are peppered throughout with
references to rumor. The historian Gregory Evans Dowd was the first to seriously
consider mmor as a legitimate and valuable line of enquiry and used the Indian Books
as his focus o f analysis.11 His work, which concentrates on the panic of 1751,
illustrates that mmors were the catalyst for the panic, which ensued between the
Cherokees and South Carolinians.

In studying the relationship between the

7David H. Corkran, The Carolina Indian Frontier (Columbia, 1970), The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict
and Survival 1740-1762 (Norman, 1962).
8M. Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era o f the
Revolution (New York, 1993).
9James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York,
1999).
10These have been collected and published in DR1A.
1Gregory Evans Dowd, “The Panic o f 1751: The Significance o f Rumors on the South CarolinaCherokee Frontier,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser. 53:3 (July 1996), 527-560.
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Cherokees and South Carolinians, Dowd suggests that each side used rumor to further
their own needs.

The second part of my thesis, which focuses upon this panic

complements Dowd’s work but goes one stage further. I have taken a number of
rumors, which gained momentum in the early 1750s and traced them from their
origins to their demise. I have been particularly keen, unlike Dowd, to analyze the
motivations behind those who were responsible for the birth and promulgation of
rumors and how these rumors mutated as they spread through the settlements.

I

found Theda Perdue’s work on Cherokee women to be particularly enlightening as
she proved, and my own thesis further illustrates, that women did play an important
part in Cherokee society.12

Whilst they remain anonymous in the sources,

nonetheless they were responsible for warning British traders of impending dangers
which they had got wind of. This thesis indicates that rumor did not always polarize
both sides, in the case of the Carolinians and Cherokees, there were, as the examples
of women illustrate, times when both sides directly interacted with one another, even
though it appeared dangerous to help those who were considered the common enemy.
Communication was clearly the key to establishing good diplomatic relations
between the British and their Indian neighbors. The first half o f my thesis indicates
that interpreters held a distinguished place in the Indian-English worlds they
inhabited.

Essentially they were cultural brokers who not only interpreted and

translated talks between each side but also straddled the immense cultural divide that
existed. They ensured for instance that English officials understood and adhered to
Indian customs and ceremonies.

Officials of the British crown had been used to

12Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Cultural Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln, 1998).

7

carrying out business transactions swiftly, but the Cherokee insisted on deeply
pondering on what had been said to them.

Often talks would be discussed with

tribesmen and repeated time and again before any agreement was reached. Officials
found themselves waiting for days to settle misunderstandings that on occasion were
the result of scurrilous rumors.
Interpreters were able, unlike their Indian countrymen, to engage in the
literate world of the English officials with whom they came in contact. The Indians
relied upon interpreters realizing that they were at a distinct disadvantage, how could
they be sure that what the settlers enunciated was also the same as what they wrote on
parchment? Skiagunsta, an elderly head warrior noted, “my tongue is my pen and my
mouth my paper.. .1 cannot write as you and your beloved men do. When I look upon
writing I am as if I were blind and in the dark... We have but one path to the English
and that is straight and clear, but on[e] each side it is darkness.”

1T

The transition and various guises of rumor are worthy of analysis because
they are an indication of the uncertainties that wracked frontier life.

As it will

become clear, the types of rumors that were most prevalent among the Cherokee
community in the 1720s and 1750s were those that directly threatened the safety and
stability of tribal life. The substance of scurrilous rumors reflected underlying
anxieties and fears in community life.

I3Talk o f the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, in DR1A, 1:80, 164, 453.

Chapter I: The Agents of Rumor
“Rumor! What evil can surpass her speed?
In movement she grows mighty, and achieves
Strength and dominion as she swifter flies.
Small at first, because afraid, she soon exalts
Her stature skyward, stalking through the lands
And mantling in the clouds, her baleful brow ...
Feet swift to run and pinions like the wind
The dreadful monster wears; her carcass huge
Is feathered, and at the root of every plume
A peering eye abides; and, strange to tell,
An equal number of vociferous tongues,
Foul, whispering lips, and ears, that catch at all...
...She can cling
To vile invention and malignant wrong,
Or mingle with her word some tidings true.”1

The vivid personification that Virgil creates of Rumor, a female bird-like
monster, clearly reveals how insignificant tidbits of gossip, discussed by a few select
individuals, have the potential to gather speed and importance as they are transmitted,
by word of mouth, from one person to groups of people. Undoubtedly, the successful
transmission of unsubstantiated information depended largely upon the atmosphere in
which the seeds of rumor were planted.

In portraying Rumor as female, Virgil

succumbed to the idea that women have a greater tendency to gossip than do their

V irgil, Aeneid Book IV, as cited in Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology o f Rumor
(New York, 1947), ii.

9

male counterparts. Perhaps this supposition was based upon the belief that women
spent a greater part of the day interacting with one another due to the nature of their
work. However, unsubstantiated information was spread by and among men as well
as women, white traders and slaves as well as Indian tribal allies and enemies. In
fact, it appears from the surviving records that men more frequently and often
unwittingly spread rumor, although it is significant that all of the evidence is recorded
from a male perspective and therefore may be biased. Indian communities attached a
great deal of importance to rumor, thereby elevating it to lofty heights, and, like
Virgil, attributed lifelike qualities to what could at best be imagined rather than
observed. In some native groups, rumors were referred to as “bad birds” of ill omen.
Rumor was pivotal in Indian societies because they were “primary oral
cultures.”

The majority of Indian tribes were not in any sense literate, even though

by the eighteenth century, tribal chiefs were well aware of the white man’s writing
habits. The historian’s formidable task is to imagine what it would have been like
living within a frontier community that functioned primarily by oral communication,
and that survived successfully in the decades before the advent of letters and other
forms of literary communication.

This requires a leap of imagination because

humankind in the twenty-first century is preconditioned by literacy, albeit augmented
by a new type of “secondary orality” sustained by the telephone, radio and
television.4 It is far easier to regard oral cultures as variants of a deficient literate

2For instance Pontiac, an Ottawa chief, traveled to Illinois in the late 1760s and was confronted by ‘bad
birds’ flying among a band of Potawatomies. Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising
(Princeton, 1947), 306-7.
3Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing o f the Word (New York, 1982), 1.
4Ibid., 11.
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universe rather than in their own right. Nonetheless, by freeing ourselves from our
inherently literate culture and focusing upon orality, one will get closer to the Indian
mentality and simultaneously gain a deeper understanding of a culture that was
distinctly at odds with that of Europe’s colonizers.
To understand how rumor was transmitted and interpreted, it is important to
understand how Indians were educated. The education of Indians was poles apart
from the methods used in the Western world; native children did not ‘study’ in the
strict sense of the word, since there were no books or texts to read.

Instead,

education, like so much else in Indian society, was conducted by means of informal
apprenticeship. Parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents, played a central role in a
child’s life, teaching them by example.
importance of the five senses.

Children learnt from a young age the

They were taught to be observant by interpreting

gestures made by those around them, to listen, and to carefully repeat what was being
uttered, since language was their only form of communication and memory their
primary mode of information storage.
Sustaining thought in an oral culture is clearly tied to communication. Indian
leaders realized the difficulty of retelling a story in exactly the same manner because
verbal sounds vanished as soon as they were enunciated. Thus, there was no way of
capturing them and distilling information as chirographic cultures did, passing down
in written form to posterity important information relating to laws and moral codes.
However, the Indians overcame this problem in part by thinking in heavily fixed
formulaic patterns, by using rhythms and repetition along with other rhetorical
devices such as alliteration or assonance. Indian communities continually listened to

proverbs and legends and this was one method employed to ensure that important
stories were passed from one generation to the next. The process of learning often
occurred by participation in the community rather than by solitary study. Without
writing techniques, Indian communities did not have the same means to record and
analyze their thoughts. The words that were enunciated could not be traced back to
their original sources because of the evanescence of sound. Without a written record,
speeches were events or occurrences, they could never be repeated in precisely the
original manner in which they had been enunciated.5 Nevertheless, their methods of
recalling information worked quite effectively. Tribespeople also placed great
emphasis upon respect for their elders, believing that old age was synonymous with
wisdom. Since knowledge was precious and simultaneously hard to retain, elders
were the walking encyclopedias of the tribe.6
Because of these oral traditions, historians of native America are forced to
work on a daily basis with indirect testimony and hearsay. Many of the surviving
documents that historians refer to in order to glean an understanding of colonial
society were written by Europeans. Even the surviving minutes of treaty councils,
which are considered to be some of the best records of Indians, were recorded from a
European perspective. Thus there is danger that either the Indian voice is submerged,
inaccurately transcribed by interpreters, or perhaps lost altogether.7 The historian’s
task is made all the more difficult by the uncertainty that the evidence available may

Tbid., 31-32.
6James H. Merrell, The Indian’s New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact
Through the Era o f Removal (Chapel Hill, 1989), 262-66; James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The
Context o f Culture in Colonial North America (New York, 1985), 14-15.
?Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal o f the Longhouse: The Peoples o f the Iroquois League in the Era o f
European Colonization (Chapel Hill, 1992), 5-6.
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be plagued with bias or deliberately distorted to further colonizers’ ambitions.

ft

Many of the practices and rituals that Indians engaged in were inconceivable to the
European mind, and therefore those sources that do remain need to be particularly
well scrutinized for cultural bias.
If historians of the colonial period readily admit the limited nature of their
evidence and their reliance on hearsay, why is it that rumor has been largely
overlooked in studies of early America?
historians approach their craft.

Part of the answer lies in the way in which

Rather than seeking to strip “away the fictive

elements of our documents so we can get to the facts,” as Natalie Zemon Davis
suggests, colonial historians should “let the ‘fictional’ aspects...be the center of
analysis.”9 Those who are reluctant to alter their approach only need note the success
of Davis’s work on sixteenth century France.

By placing rumor at the center of

analysis, historians are truly engaging the world of the trader and the Indian and are
simultaneously illustrating, as Marc Bloch suggested over half a century ago, that
rumor can provide both a window and a mirror into a group’s “collective
consciousness.” 10 Essentially, the historian and Indian share the same problem, the
only difference being that the Indians faced it with far greater urgency, which was on
occasion life threatening.
The success of a rumor, whether it spread and was believed by only a few
tribespeople —a few were all that were needed to cause disruption—depended on a
8James Axtell, “Ethnohistory: An Historian’s Viewpoint,” in Axtell, The European and the Indian:
Essays in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North America (New York, 1981), 8; “Through Another Glass
Darkly: Early Indian Views o f Europeans,” in Axtell, After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory o f
Colonial North America (New York, 1988), 28.
N atalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century
France (Stanford, 1987), 3.
10Marc Bloch, The H istorian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 106-107.
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number of factors. Social tension or the threat of war between tribes was often a
breeding ground for rumor. Colonel George Chicken’s journal of his travels amongst
the Cherokee nation in 1725, along with Captain Fitch’s journal among the Creeks a
year later, clearly illustrate the problems these communities faced; an off-the-cuff
comment that began as insignificant could suddenly mutate into a rumor and grow to
huge proportions, motivating individuals to react in diverse ways.11 There was no
foolproof way of verifying oral “Accots” except by direct confrontation with the
enemy or news gathered from trusted allies, and even then allies could within a short
space of time become enemies.

10

Nonetheless, Chicken relied upon several sources

for reliable information: the correspondence of Arthur Middleton, president o f the
Trade Council, documents that intermittently arrived from England, and interpreters
for verification or dismissal of local rumor. Yet even reliable local news was often
slow in coming due to the locations of Indian settlements. Chicken was frequently
forced to think on his feet and to employ common sense when it came to accepting or
dismissing rumors.
For instance, whilst he was visiting Keowee, two Chickasaws arrived from the
town of Savannah with the news that a band of Cowetas had set out against the
Yamasees and that the Upper Creeks intended to rise up against the peoples of the
Upper Settlement.13 After establishing that this rumor had come from a Creek,

11Allport and Postman, Psychology o f Rumor, 1-33.
12Colonel Chicken makes references to ‘Accots’ (accounts) throughout his journal. “Journal o f
Colonel George Chicken’s Mission from Charleston, South Carolina to the Cherokees, 1726,” in
Newton D. Mereness ed., Travels in the American Colonies (New York, 1916) (Hereafter cited as
“Chicken’s Journal.”)
13Keowee was the principal town o f the Lower Cherokees, situated on the Keowee River in what is
present-day Oconee County, South Carolina. The Chickasaws maintained friendly relations with the

14

Chicken dismissed it because, as he told the Chickasaws, “if it had been true I should
have heard of it before now from the commander of the Savannah garrison or some of
our white men.”14 Nevertheless, it is clear from a letter sent to Middleton that
Chicken was still uncertain about the authenticity of the rumor even after dismissing
it.15 He was in a difficult position because he had to make decisions without sending
runners out to ascertain the true situation.
The Cherokees were distributed over three areas: the Lower Settlement, in
what is now western South Carolina and northeastern Georgia; the Middle Settlement,
in western North Carolina and northern Georgia; and the Upper Settlement, in
western Tennessee and northern Alabama.

The Upper Creeks lived in the region

surrounded by the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers whilst the Lower Creeks lived by the
Chattahoochee River.16 The long distances that had to be traveled to reach each
settlement made Chicken’s expeditions more difficult. Early in his journal he noted
several occasions when he was forced to leave the trail to retrieve a lost horse and or
to wait out bad weather.

17

•

These unavoidable delays could cause anxiety for those

tribes who had heard of his presence in their territories. Had he been attacked, did he
turn back, or was his expected arrival a mere rumor? On one occasion Chicken, who
was surprised that his arrival had been expected, questioned the headmen o f the towns
surrounding Tugaloo, asking them where they had heard this information because he

English but were habitually at war with some o f their neighboring tribes. The Cowetas were Lower
Creeks who resided in what is now Russell County, Alabama.
14“Chicken’s Journal,” 133, 26 August 1725.
15Ibid., 137,30 August 1725.
16David Corkran, The Carolina Indian Frontier (Columbia, 1970), 13.
i7“Chicken’s Journal,” 99, 26 June 1725.
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had not sent runners ahead to prepare them.18 The Indians replied that although white
men had not passed on the news, the arrival of a government official was expected
because their king had been sent a commission suggesting that the English might lend
assistance against Cherokee enemies.19 Similarly, the Creeks had been expecting the
arrival of an Englishman for some time, as Captain Fitch found out on meeting sixty
headmen at the town of Okchayi.20 One of the headmen informed Fitch, “we have
bin a long time ‘threatened’ with a talk to be sent among us but its not coming after so
many promises we had now given over expecting any, but we are heartily glad to see
you on our land.”21 Such expectations may have unsettled the English officials who
had hopes of quietly observing the Indians’ latest trading activities. At any rate, they
did not want the Indians to feel threatened by their presence.
The primary purpose of Colonel Chicken’s year-long expedition among the
Cherokees and Captain Fitch’s among the Creeks was to assess which branches of
each tribe were true friends of the English and which were feigning friendship and
intriguing with the French and Spanish. By 1725, the English had developed good
trading relations with the Cherokees and to a lesser degree with the Creeks.
However, these relations were threatened by rumors of warfare, by avaricious traders
who cheated and thereby agitated the Indians, and by French emissaries from
Louisiana who attempted to disrupt British trade by inciting the Cherokees to war

18Tugaloo was a Cherokee town situated at the confluence o f the Tugaloo River and Toccoa Creek in
Habersham County, Georgia.
19“Chicken’s Journal,” 105, 16 July 1725.
20Okchayi was an upper Creek town on Oktchayi (now Kialaga) Creek, in the southeastern part o f the
Coosa County, Alabama.
21“Joumal o f Captain Tobias Fitch’s Mission from Charleston to the Creeks, 1726,” in Newton D.
Mereness ed., Travels in the American Colonies (New York, 1916), 178, 20 July 1726. (Hereafter
“Fitch’s Journal.”)
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against the Creeks. Chicken and Fitch were also sent among the Indians to convince
them of English friendship, to assure them that the ‘Talks’ they carried from the king
of England were truthful and that any local news they relayed to them was accurate.
Chicken’s account of his presence on Indian soil appears to have impressed many of
the tribal headmen, who “had long expected a beloved man of the English among
them and that now they had sent me and they were as glad to see me as if I had come
from above.”22 The Creeks welcomed Fitch, declaring that he was the first white man
they had seen since peace with the Cherokees was announced. However, unlike their
newfound allies, they did not hold elaborate ceremonies to receive him or lavish gifts
upon him.
Fitch was satisfied with the reception he received at the hands of the Creeks;
he was not interested in giving or receiving gifts because he did not believe that gifts
were necessarily a sign of true friendship. Fitch’s opinion regarding gift-giving was
further enunciated by the king of the Okchayi, who suggested that although he did not
have the wherewithal to bestow bountiful gifts like those he had seen his people
return with after visiting the English king, he was nonetheless as “straight hearted as
the best of them that has been down.”23 Fitch’s response indicates that the English
had found that gift-giving was not in the long term a successful way of securing
friendship or wiping out rumors: “As you say your people mind my king’s talk no
longer than the presents last, for when your people are with my king, they tell him

22“Chicken’s Journal,” 101,5 July 1725.
23“Fitch’s Journal,” 177, 16 July 1726.
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that they are his good friends; but when they come here they never mind what they
promise to my king.”24
Both Chicken and Fitch were representatives of a country that had attempted
through gift-giving to control, amongst other things, how news was passed between
and among tribes. It was apparent by 1725 that gift-giving was an expensive and
ineffective method of obtaining long-term friendship with the Indians. Chicken and
Fitch looked for other ways to influence Indian culture and to obtain trust and
assurances from them.

They were quick to remind Indian tribesmen, by sharp

rebukes, how good the English had been to them, furnishing them with weapons and
ammunition.

Fitch chided the people of Okchayi upon realizing that their young

people digested and reacted to rumors more hastily than the older members of the
tribe:
“I must tell your young men that if it had not been for us, you would not know
how to war, nor yet have anything to war with. You have had nothing but
bows and arrow’s to kill deer...now you have learnt the use of firearms as
well to kill deer and other provisions as to war against your enemies. Yet you
set no greater value on us who have been such good friends unto you, then on
your greatest enemies, this all you that are old men knows to be true. And I
0^
would have you make your young men sensible of it.”
*

*

There was constant tension between the young warriors and council elders of
the eastern tribes of North America.

Waging war and maintaining peace were

possibly the most important activities in the lives of Indian men and women. War
created chaos and ripped kinship relationships apart, often shattering the inner
sanctum of family life irrevocably. Women were particularly vulnerable because of
the relatively isolated tasks they performed, which included fetching water, gathering
24Ibid„ 178.
25Ibid., 181,20 July 1726.
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nuts, and firewood.26 On one of many instances, a Cherokee woman set out with a
male protector to gather some wild herbs to make salt. In the short time that her
protector left her side to kill a turkey, he returned and to his dismay “espied some
•

•

•

enemies who he found had taken away the woman he left behind him.”

77

The

Cherokees were unsuccessful in their efforts to recover the woman. They informed
Chicken of their intentions to make peace with tribes to the south of them (Creeks), so
that they could venture out to hunt and confidently “leave their women and children
at home.”28
The waging of war was not taken lightly; insecurity and humiliation were
considerably less appealing than peace and prosperity. Nonetheless, young Indian
men were eager to prove their worth by brave feats in war. This is not surprising
given the rituals and strenuous tests of endurance that they had encountered during
the rite of passage from childhood to manhood.29 It is little wonder, then, that young
men were more susceptible to rumor. King Brim commented to Fitch with reference
to the young men of the Lower Towns:
“There are a great many stories that come into this nation but from whence
they come I cannot tell. Sometimes I hear your king is joined the [Te?] and
coming to cut us off. We that are head men give no credit to these stories but
the young men may believe them for what I know and likewise add to
them.”30
In their desire to reach the lofty status of ‘hero’ within their communities, the
young men of the Tallapoops and Abecas attacked and seriously injured an English

26Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Cultural Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln, 1988), 87.
27“Chicken’s Journal,” 113, 28 July 1725.
28Ibid.,
29James Axtell ed., The Indian Peoples o f Eastern America: A Documentary History o f The Sexes
(New York, 1981), 141-70.
30“Fitch’s Journal,” 182, 20 July 1726.
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trader named Sharp, stealing his hides while he was with the Cherokees.31 This
action infuriated Fitch because it further delayed a peace treaty that the Creeks were
supposedly making with the Cherokees.

Hobyhawchey, who was responsible for

bringing news of the peace to the English, said, “The news came in of what was done
to the white man at the Cherokees. I then thought [it] needless to send down to your
king for I expected nothing less than a war.”32 Fitch admonished Gogell Ey, a mature
man of years, saying, “You ought to have known better and since you were the head
of those people you should have prevented their roguish proceedings.”

Moreover,

in the event of Sharp’s death, “I do assure you that my king would require no less
satisfaction than your life and the lives of all the head men that were with you; and if
your people should have denied to deliver you up then my king would have taken
satisfaction with the muzzles of their guns.”34
Whilst Fitch did not lay the blame entirely on the younger tribesmen, he
wanted to know what actions the elders of the tribes involved intended to take. The
reply he received to his questions was encouraging: “We believe that our young
people have and will suffer so severely for this that they will take care how they bring
themselves and friends into trouble again.”35 Whilst these words were reassuring,
how could Fitch rely on the Indians to subjugate their young inhabitants? One of the
headmen went on, “if any of our young men will be so head strong as not to follow
orders and will commit any hostilities on your people at the Cherokees or else where,

31The Tallapoops were Creeks who inhabited the region o f the Upper Tallapoosa River. The Abecas
were Upper Creeks who inhabited a town on or near to the Upper Coosa River.
32“Fitch’s Journal,” 180-1, 16 July 1726.
33Ibid., 178, 20 July 1726.
34Ibid., 179.
35Ibid., 191, 14 September 1726.
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we will then deliver the offenders to your king and he may do with them as he thinks
fit.”

In addition to this, the tribal leaders agreed that they would not permit any of

their people to go to war without sending leading men with them, since they were the
only ones who could be trusted.37
Rumors gathered strength in the absence of trust. How could these British
men have confidence in what the Indian tribal leaders said, especially when they had
let them down in the past? Perhaps it was the tone of their words or the gestures they
used in enunciating these messages of reliance and friendship that convinced Chicken
and Fitch of their true intentions. But, then as now, actions spoke louder than words.
King Brim, an elder, readily admitted that he had not obeyed British orders in the
past. Nonetheless, he desired to prove that he was serious about his task of warring
with the Yamasees and offered the services of his son Sepey Coffee to lead his tribe
because he was too old. Still, could Sepey Coffee be relied upon? After all, he was
young and had recently been allied to the French and Spanish. Brim confirmed his
son’s speech which declared his allegiance to the English and persuaded Fitch that
“he has had so much said to him that he will now prove as true to you as ever he did
to them.”

Fitch must have realized the dangerous implications of placing his trust in

the hands of this youngster; his disloyalty would have proven disastrous, given the
contacts he had with the French and Spanish. On reaching the town of Apalachicola,
Fitch uneasily noted the display of friendship that Coffee showed towards a

36Ibid.,
37Ibid., 190.
38Ibid., 183,2 August 1726.
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Spaniard. 39 However, he seemed to be reassured by Coffee’s actions; he noted that
friendly gestures were employed to prevent the Spaniard doubting his real intentions
and discovering his plans against the Yamasees.40
The presence of Spaniards among the Indians was troublesome for a number
of reasons. They were responsible for planting rumors among the Indians and then
plied the natives with brandy that “soon put the town into confusion.”41

On

questioning the Spaniards about the purpose of their trip among the Creeks, Fitch
discovered that Brim had allegedly sent one of his men to St Augustine requesting the
Spaniards to “bring a talk” to his men and, on receiving it, he would send one back to
the Spanish. The Spaniard had brought a slave, stolen from the English, to speak with
and interpret the words of the Indians.

Fitch received the slave and therefore

successfully managed to prevent the Spanish from relaying their false talks to the
Indians. Dismissing the excuses given for being on Creek soil, he said “I do not
doubt that you have some lying stories to tell the Indians which is customary for you
to do, and I should do you justice, seize you and send you where the Negro is
going.”42 But this was unnecessary; the Spanish ‘mouthpiece’ had been successfully
apprehended.

Fitch’s presence proved to be very fortunate; as one of the local

headmen told him, “if you had not been here we should have had their talk for two or

39Apalachicola is a town in Hitchiti; the Indians here were closely associated with the Creeks.
40“Fitch’s Journal,” 184, 7 August 1726.
41Ibid.,
42Ibid„
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three days. They are often coming here with talk and we never find any of their talks
to be true and I know of no one here that wants any of their talk.”43
In a similar vein, Chicken was forced to deal with the French and their rumor
mongering tactics. He did not get the opportunity to confront them face-to-face but
was forced to interpret rumors as he heard them. These rumors were potentially of a
more threatening kind; they alluded to the strength of the enemy and therefore stirred
up more uncertainty among the Cherokees.

Before leaving the town of Tellico,

Chicken interpreted an account from three Chickasaws. They claimed that the Weeotee-noes had killed the Chickasaw king along with several other men, even though the
Chickasaws were at peace with them.44 Moreover, they indicated that the Broad
River was full of canoes containing French Indians and they were surrounding nearby
towns.45

Whilst Chicken was perturbed to hear such news, he did not react

immediately; in fact, he waited two weeks to report the news to Middleton, writing
“how true this information is I cannot assure you because they [the Chickasaws] are
always known to be a people that run from one nation to another inventing what
stories they can to ‘amuse’ the people w ith.. .1 am very jealous of them overpowering
them [the Cherokees] at one time or another.”46

43Ibid., 187, 8 August 1726. Chicken was aware that slaves were spreading rumors among the
Cherokees. He reported in a letter to Middleton, “The slaves that are now coming up talk good
English as well as the Cherokee language and I am afraid too often tell fallacies to the Indians which
they are very apt to believe.” “Chicken’s Journal,” 139, 30 August 1725.
44The Weeo-tee-noes were French Indians.
45“Chicken’s Journal,” 120-2, 12 August 1725.
46Ibid., 136, 30 August 1725.
On the second o f September, Chickasaw men and women came to Keowee to report that the Cowetas
were engaged in a battle against the Yamasees and that the Upper Creeks had plans to attack the Upper
Cherokees. Ibid., 140.
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This was not the only time when the Cherokees were adversely affected by
rumor. Chicken was surprised to learn that a Creek man from Coosa and an African
slave woman, who were enemies of the Cherokees, had been received into the town
of Tellico where they remained for four days.47 After this time, the Coosa man fled in
fear leaving his companion but “particularly gave her in charge to talk about a peace”
for six Creek towns.48 The presence of a woman of low standing in these negotiations
indicates that the Creeks intermittently relied upon the diplomatic services of
women.49 Furthermore, in a letter to Middleton, Chicken argued that the main reason
they were allowed into the town was due to the presence of the slave woman, who
was one of the headman’s relations.50 The Coosa man had used the slave woman as a
pawn and told the headman that once he negotiated peace all the Cherokee slaves that
the Creeks had among them would be safely returned.

Chicken admonished the

headman, telling him that this was an evil rumor, that the Coosa man had no intention
of making peace but sought to establish the strength of the town and lull them into a
false sense of safety, so that they would be unsuspecting and unprepared for
forthcoming attacks.
Clearly the dissemination of rumors was a serious problem that wracked
diplomatic relations, and both Chicken and Fitch attempted to overcome their
problems with varying success.

In his role as Indian commissioner for South

Carolina, Chicken sought to decrease the number of Indian communication channels

47Coosa was an Upper Creek town situated on the Coosa River in the Talladega County, Alabama.
48“Chicken’s Journal,” 134-35, 30 August 1725.
49Perdue discusses the diverse roles o f Cherokee women in wartime. Perdue, Cherokee Women, 86108.
50“Chicken’s Journal,” 142, 9 September 1725.
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by nominating warriors to officially relay business matters. At a general meeting
with the Cherokees he indicated to Middleton that he had stipulated “When ever they
[Cherokees] sent any of their people about business to the English that they might be
head warriors, that we might know how to use them, and those were the people
among them that we must take the most notice of.”51

This instruction had

repercussions for Indian women because it directly affected their political status.
Women usually participated in politics at the clan level, but Chicken’s instruction
represented a shift from ‘kin’ to ‘warrior’ and effectively excluded them from the
military arena.52 In theory at least, their roles as diplomatic negotiators among and
between the Cherokees and the English ended. Nonetheless, those women who were
as convincing as the African slave woman at Coosa may still have caught the
attention of and swayed local listeners by their news. In addition, Chicken’s appeal
for exclusive negotiation with warriors undermined Cherokee political practices. In
matters of diplomacy it was customary for the Cherokees to send a group of
individuals, including a warrior along with other men whom the tribe held in high
esteem. The fact that Chicken’s successor, John Herbert, was troubled by the same
problems suggests that Chicken’s instructions fell largely on deaf ears. At a meeting
held at Nequisey in 1727 representatives from seven towns gathered. Only three of
the towns sent only warriors to represent them; the other towns continued their
traditions of sending a select group of warriors and other distinguished tribesmen. 53

51Ibid., 138, 30 August 1725.
52Perdue, Cherokee Women, 92.
53Ibid.,
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Nevertheless, from the 1730s onwards, consensual politics gave way to an assertive
decision-making process dominated by warriors.54
The issuance of instructions to the Indians was not always the most effective
way to slow down or halt the dissemination of rumors. The presence of interpreters
who acted as cultural brokers between English and Cherokee peoples often helped to
prevent misunderstandings because they straddled the divide between European and
Indian cultures; thus their presence often impeded the diffusion of false rumors.55
Essentially, interpreters were “go-betweens” who often had a command of English
and at least one Indian language.56 They ultimately determined what was relayed
from Chicken and Fitch’s speeches to the Indian tribes and vice versa; their
attendance at meetings and more informal occasions made possible the exchange of
words and promises between groups who were foreign to one another.

A small

number of those who traveled among the tribes of the Eastern Woodlands were
persons of mixed European and Indian parentage.

Two of the best-known mixed-

race interpreters of the Eastern Woodlands were Andrew Montour and Arent Stevens

54Ibid., 94.
55James Axtell, “Babel o f Tongues: Communicating with the Indians in Eastern North America,” in
Gray, Edward G. and Fieiring, Norman, eds., The Language Encounter in the Americas, 1492 to 1800.
Providence and New York: Berghahn Books, 2000, 15-60; Nancy L. Hagedom, “‘A Friend To Go
Between Them:’ The Interpreter as Cultural Broker During Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-70,”
Ethnohistory, 1988, 35 (1): 60-80 at 60.
56Andrew Montour spoke English and French fluently along with a number o f Indian languages.
Hagedom, ‘“ Faithful, Knowing, and Prudent’: Andrew Montour as Interpreter and Cultural Broker,
1740-1772,” in Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker, ed. Margaret Connell Szasz
(Norman, 1994), 44-60 at 45.
57The official name o f those o f mixed parentage is metis. Metis usually applies to those persons who
have one French and one Indian parent. However, like Hagedom I have extended this to include all
individuals o f mixed ancestry. This is less offensive than the terms “mixed bloods” or “half breeds.”
Ibid., 76.
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who operated among the Iroquois.58 The Iroquois held Montour in high esteem; they
often employed him as a speaker and regarded him as a war chief.59 Mixed race
interpreters were particularly fortunate because they grew up and mingled between
two cultures and thus tended to be more sensitive to cultural differences because of
their upbringings.60

Nonetheless, the continual forays back and forth between

cultures could trap interpreters in a permanent no-man’s land.

The confusion

regarding their identity, which sprang from their mixed parentage, affected their sense
of belonging. Montour, for instance, answered to several names, including ‘French
Andrew’ and ‘Andrew Sattelihu’ and his countenance and style of dress did not help
to establish his identity; while some thought that he was European, others described
him as an Indian.61
Many of the interpreters that the British crown used were English and they
were paid for their loyalty and services. Often they were required to swear an oath of
fidelity, promising to uphold and promote the province in Indian .affairs.62 Their
wages varied according to their ability, Joseph Cooper, for example, received twentyfive pounds in 1725 for his efforts as a “linguister” in the Cherokee nation, whereas in
the early 1750s, Montour received one hundred pounds when he transferred to the
Northern Department of Indian Affairs.

Chicken used incentives to encourage

58Andrew Montour (ca. 1715-1772) was the son o f interpreter Madame Montour and Carondawana, an
Oneida war chief. During his childhood he lived among the Oneidas in New York and later among the
Delawares and Shawnees o f Pennsylvania. Hagedom, ‘“Andrew Montour,’ 40.
59Ibid., 50.
60Hagedom, “Brokers o f Understanding: Interpreters as Agents o f Cultural Exchange in Colonial New
York,” New York History 1995, 76 (4): 379-408 at 381.
61James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York,
1999), 75-76.
62Axtell, “Babel o f Tongues,” 51.
63“Chicken’s Journal,” 165, 19 October 1725; Hagedom, “Andrews Montour,” 53.
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interpreters to be hardworking and honest translators. In one instance, he indicated to
Eleazer Wigan that providing he remained loyal to the crown, Chicken would convey
his aptitude as a linguist to the British government: “I cannot but believe you have
been and may be of service so you need not doubt but on a true representation of your
care and fidelity to them that they’ll readily requite you.”64
The journals of these men suggest that the interpreters were not always by
their sides but lived among the Indians. By living among Cherokee tribes, English
interpreters familiarized themselves with the Cherokee language; each settlement
spoke a slight variant of the mother tongue.

Moreover, settling among Indian

families gave them an intimate knowledge of not only native tongues but also of the
numerous rituals and religious beliefs that existed; they immersed themselves in
Indian traditions which afforded them an awareness of their hopes and fears; they
became “repositories” of Indian culture because they realized that their success
depended upon their intimate understanding of a diverse culture.65 Interpreters who
were blest with both linguistic and diplomatic skills often moved effortlessly back
and forth across the cultural divide. They gained prestige and influence by virtue of
their specialized skills, providing that they performed satisfactorily.66 Chicken and
Fitch sent letters to the interpreters to bring important matters to their attention and
often asked them to be their scouts, fishing out information and reporting it to them.
In one such letter, Chicken wrote to Wigan: “The reason of me sending you this is to
desire you to encourage the people in your parts to go out in one body. I suppose

64Ibid., “Chicken’s Journal.”
65Hagedom, “ ‘A Friend,” 61, Szasz “Introduction,” 3-20 at 6; Axtell, “Babel o f Tongues,” 41.
66Hagedom, “Brokers o f Understanding,” 381.
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they’ll have a meeting which I desire you to be at and let me know what steps they
intend to take to prevent their enemies from doing them damage.”

f\H

The sharp tone

of another letter sent to Wigan illustrates the extent to which Chicken relied on him.
“I cannot too much caution you of letting me know the truth of all affairs among
these people [you being on oath] the nature of which I hope you are not unacquainted
with.”68
These interpreters occupied a rather delicate position because, although they
lived among the Indians and consequently had a much deeper understanding of this
unstable environment than either Chicken or Fitch, in order to be successful they
needed to earn the respect and friendship of the tribes, which would not happen if
they scurried off to report every event to the British government. On the other hand,
it was imperative that they carefully scrutinize information before relaying it to
ensure that it did not contain rumor; otherwise there was danger that the rumor would
find its way onto the President of Trade’s desk. On both accounts it was of primary
importance to represent both the Indians and the English fairly and accurately to each
other in order to prevent misunderstandings, which often led to the outbreak of
hostilities. Perhaps in their role as translators, they may have used their power and
authority to tone down points that were potentially contentious.69 In one letter to
Wigan, Chicken said, “take great care that you do not acquaint me with anything but
what you are first assured is truth, you very well knowing how we have heretofore

67“Chicken’s Journal,” 148-49, 16 September 1725.
68Ibid., 165, 19 October 1725.
69Hagedom, “ ‘A Friend,” 71.
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been amused with fallacies and what charge the country has been at to set those
stories in a true light.”

70

Together with being a power broker and scout, the interpreter was also a
diplomatic agent, ensuring, for example, that the tribesmen of the Upper Settlements
made their brethren in the Middle and Lower Settlements aware of any resolutions by
sending messages to them. These types of diplomatic relations, whether successful or
not, were at least one way of attempting to quash rumor.

Nonetheless, whilst

interpreters could advance negotiations by ensuring that reliable information was
passed between parties, they could and did on occasion hinder discussions to suit their
own purposes; such actions seriously undermined the trust that had been invested in
them by both the English and the Indians.71 Fitch encountered this problem when he
decided to change his interpreter.

He believed that William Hodge was better

equipped to speak with the people of the Lower Towns than was John Molton.
Furious at this decision, an intoxicated Molton followed Fitch to the Lower Towns
and accused him in the presence of the Indians that (as Fitch wrote) “I was a thief,
had stole his servant (William Hodge) and not to mind what I had said to them as my
talk was not good.”72 These allegations proved to be quite harmful because, although
Fitch charged Molton to behave with more respect, Hodge was not able to engage in
any discourse with the Indians. Furthermore, Fitch encountered the same problem
when he returned to speak with the Cowetas on the following day. Molton, now

70Ibid„
71The trustworthiness o f mixed-race interpreters was also questioned. Montour’s character was
considered to be “unfathomable,” because it was never clear with which group he truly sympathized.
Merrell, Into the American Woods, 77.
72“Fitch’s Journal,” 207, 28 December 1726.
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sober, again persuaded the headmen not to engage in any discussion with Fitch whilst
Hodges acted as interpreter. Motivated by self-interest and concerned that Hodge
would undermine his position as an interpreter, Molton deliberately stirred up unrest
amongst a number of the Indians who sympathized with him. In turn, they implored
Fitch to use Molton as an interpreter because they claimed that they could not
understand Hodge. Sepe Coffee came to the rescue and made Fitch aware of the
dissembling tactics that the Indians were using. He informed him that “Hodge could
speak their tongue nearly as well as themselves” and shamed the Indians who
objected to Hodge by asking them which part of the talk they did not understand.”
Whilst Coffee proved his loyalty to Fitch through these actions and prevented further
misunderstandings and bad feeling, Molton’s actions indicated that he could neither
be trusted nor relied upon.74
As with the interpreters, Chicken and Fitch could not always rely on English
traders for accurate information or good behavior. Rumors circulated among nations
regarding the avarice of the traders. Chicken investigated such rumors because they
were potentially damaging to the maintenance of favorable diplomatic and trading
relations.75 In one instance, Captain Charles Russell informed Colonel Chicken that
David Doway, an Indian trader, had sworn under oath that John Sharp had stolen a
number of hides from the Cherokees.76 However, Chicken found on questioning the
headmen of the Upper Settlements and assuring them that he would right any wrongs
73Ibid., 208.
74Inebriation was a problem among both interpreters and Indians. Those who provided liquor to Indians
were not good role models for responsible drinking. Montour was reported to have been quite abusive
during his drunken bouts. Hagedom, “Andrew Montour,” 58, Merrell, Into the American Woods, 99100 .
75Hagedom, “Brokers o f Understanding,” 386.
76“Chicken’s Journal,” 97-8, 22 June 1725. John Sharp was also an Indian trader.
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done; the head warrior of the Tugelo said that he was aware of the whole matter and
Sharp had not stolen skins from the Indians but was merely collecting his debts from
them.77
Chicken appears from his journal entries to have had little regard for the
traders, believing they were troublemakers and rumor-mongers. He suggested in a
letter to Middleton that the Indian trading law ought to be changed so that traders
would be permitted to trade only in just two towns of their choice. It was Chicken’s
opinion that as the traders moved from town to town they carried rumors with them,
*

which was “a great detriment to trade.”

78

• •

•

In addition, Chicken generally disapproved

of the servants whom the traders brought with them; he described them as “a loose
vagabond sort of people who will not stick out to say or do anything among the
Indians for the lucre of a few skins, so that I think the fewer of them there is the
better.”79
In contrast, Fitch’s relationship with the traders appears to be have been quite
amicable. On one occasion, in particular, William Wood, an English trader, warned
Fitch that the Indians who had assembled to speak with him were agitated about the
amount of time that he devoted to speaking of war. Wood informed Fitch, “We that
are white men have been very much slighted by them ...it is my opinion that if you
rehearse the same talk that you gave them last that we shall all be murdered.”80 To
his credit, Fitch, confronted the Indians, saying “I can assure you my king will make a
war with you which I have in words from his own mouth, and like it how you will I
77Ibi<±, 130,21 August 1725.
78Ibid., 106-7, 17 July 1725, letter to Middleton.
79Ibid., 107.
80“Fitch’s Journal,” 195, 1 November 1726.
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cannot help it, for I came here to tell you the truth and that I shall do.”81 To this the
King of the Oasfuskee replied, “Tis true we were speaking pretty angry but it was
about the Chickasaws and not about you. I do assure you that we desire to have no
difference with you.” Determined to establish the truth of the matter, Fitch called
forward the trader who repeated the words he had heard; the Indians seemed to be
concerned that they had been caught out but still denied the claims that had been
made against them.

o7

Whilst rumors intermittedly rumbled around the countryside, rumor flourished
in areas and among people who were ill at ease, distrusting the true motives of the
other. In a world where accounts and messages were almost always impossible to
verify immediately, the unknown was an uncertain and frightening prospect. Those
who had something to gain on occasion added to these doubts, including the French
and Spanish, traders and interpreters. There were instances where others unwittingly
added to these uncertainties by innocently relaying news they had heard as they
passed from town to town. Each side sought to protect themselves and their own
interests, which, unsurprisingly, created serious tensions amongst tribal communities
and foreign powers.

81Ibid., 196, 2 November 1726.
82Ibid., 197.

Chapter II: The R esolutions of Rumor
Rumor, like a breeze, murmured through the Cherokee countryside. At times
it passed gently over Indian communities, leaving the inhabitants undisturbed by the
hearsay it deposited. On other occasions, it dropped pregnant words into the air,
which like viruses were contracted by one person and shortly afterwards passed
among many. The power of enunciated words, displayed both by the speed with
which they were spread and the various reactions they spawned, is astonishing.
Rumor can be used as a gauge to measure the degree o f anxiety experienced by
borderland communities in the eighteenth century. The diverse forces attributing to
the dissemination of rumor reveals a number of fears deeply embedded in society and
simultaneously exemplifies the conflicting hopes and aspirations of competing
groups.
The success of rumor depended upon the extent to which communities
responded to unsubstantiated information. On first inspection, it is surprising that
rumor managed to appear and cause dissension in relatively stable communities, even
those unconvulsed by the terrors of war, plague, or starvation. Rumor was divisive; it
tore communities apart by falsely creating convincing anecdotes that were considered
to be either partially or wholly true. Distinguishing between fact and fiction was
33
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extraordinarily difficult in oral communities. The conflict that developed between the
Cherokees and South Carolinians in 1751 clearly illustrates the difficulties caused by
the lack of reliable information. Both groups experienced extreme anxiety because
they relied heavily upon one another for the maintenance of peace.
During the eighteenth century the Cherokees became one of the most
powerful Indian tribes on the frontiers of English America.1 In 1751 the thirty-five
years of relative peace that the South Carolinians and Cherokees had enjoyed was
suddenly disrupted. This long-term alliance had not been without its problems. The
War of Jenkin’s Ear and King George’s War undoubtedly created anxieties, but
persistent negotiations smoothed over these concerns. Both groups valued the pact
between them because it was mutually beneficial. The Cherokees, for their part,
relied upon manufactured goods from their white allies. These included clothing,
guns, powder, and iron. Skiagunsta, the elderly head warrior of the Lower Towns,
was aware of their dependence on the settlers, “I have always told my people to be
well with the English for they cannot expect any supply from any where else. The
cloaths we wear, we cannot make ourselves, they are made for us. We use their
ammunition with which we kill deer. We cannot make our guns. Every necessary
thing in life we must have from the white people.”2 In return for these vital supplies,
the Cherokees traded deerskins with the British.3 Hunting deer had become the
tribes’ chief industry by 1750.

Thus, the relationship that had been cultivated

’David H. Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival 1740-1762 (Norman, 1962), 3.
Proceedings o f the Council concerning Indian Affairs, 7 July 1753, in William L. McDowell, Jr., ed.,
Colonial Records o f South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, May 21 1750 - August 7
1754, 2 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1958), 1: 453 (hereafter DRIA)
3The colonial authorities set prices in terms o f deerskins; they became “the currency o f the Carolina
trade.” Perdue, Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Cultural Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln,
1988), 77.
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between the Cherokees and South Carolinians was based upon reciprocity.
Diplomatic and trading relations were fundamental to the social well-being of both
groups and it was therefore in everyone’s interest to remain on good terms.
Furthermore, the geographical location of the Cherokees was important from a
British perspective. Although the Cherokees were mountain dwellers, they were not
isolated. Their territories were divided into three main settlements, which stretched
across South Carolina to the Ohio Valley and spanned the headwaters of the
Tennessee, Kanawha and Savannah rivers.4 The location of these settlements were
important because they acted as buffers for the British in South Carolina against
possible attacks from the French and Spanish who possessed lands along the Gulf of
Mexico.

At the same time, the Cherokees possessed a powerful geographical

weapon; the “key of Carolina” provided another route into the colony.5 If they so
desired, they were well positioned to send warriors eastward into Virginia, the
Carolinas, and Georgia.

During May 1751 when relations were seriously

deteriorating, Governor James Glen of South Carolina, realized the importance of
restoring harmony: “It is absolutely necessary for us to be in friendship with the
Cherokees in particular...They are reckoned to be about three thousand gunmen, the
greatest nation we know of in America except the Choctaws and while we call them
friends we may consider them a bulwark at our backs; for such numbers will always
secure us in that quarter from the attempts of the French.”6 Even as late as 1755,

4M. Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era o f the
Revolution (New York, 1993), 13.
5Ibid., 71-72.
6Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 15.
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trader Ludovic Grant reaffirmed the importance of the Cherokees when he informed
Glen that “Carolina hath no greater barrier against the French.”
Given the benefits that both parties enjoyed from this relationship, its
deterioration was an acute blow. For eight months the Cherokees and Carolinians
were wracked by uncertainties; their long-term friendship was seriously in jeopardy
and each side feared the prospect of war. This leads one to question the content and
scale of the rumors, which circulated between both groups to provoke such hostility,
and such antagonism is all the more astounding considering the strength of their
friendship. Deep-seated fears unleashed alarm, which engulfed Cherokee and South
Carolinian communities and led to outbreaks of violence. The agitation that resulted
illustrates that on occasion the resolution of rumor was far from peaceful.
The volume of evidence that historians have at their disposal of these eight
troublesome months is substantial.

Before the British establishment of Indian

superintendencies in 1756, all matters pertaining to Indian affairs were dealt with by
South Carolina’s Executive Council. The governor of the colony, who was ultimately
held accountable by the British government for its proper administration, relied upon
a select group of trusted militia officers to keep him abreast of the current affairs of
the kingdom. One of their main responsibilities was to gather intelligence and then
report on the findings.

This information was assembled mainly from letters and

affidavits that came from traders and backcountry merchants.

On occasion these

emissaries directly reported on events or ‘talks’ that took place while they were on

7Ludovic Grant to Governor Glen, 20 August 1755, in DRIA, 2:74.
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their travels.

8

•

*

*

It was believed that this material was significant enough to warrant

separation from the proceedings of the elective branch of the legislature recorded in
the Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly.9 Consequently the materials that
were gathered from these intelligence expeditions were copied into “Indian Books,”
so “that all those matters may be seen in one view.”10
The “Indian Books” are peppered throughout with references to rumor, and
the crisis of 1751 is an excellent example of the decisive role that rumors played in
the panic that ensued. On occasion, the “Indian Books” provide an opportunity to
analyze the motivation behind those who were responsible for starting rumors and
how these rumors mutated as they spread through the settlements. Broadly speaking,
the rumors that developed between the two groups were diverse in terms of their
content. For instance, the rumors that circulated among the Cherokees for the most
part pertained to whole-scale invasion of their territories by the Carolinians. For their
part the Carolinians believed that the Cherokees were conspiring with the French and
intended to carry out raids against them.

However, the sources indicate that the

Carolinians were particularly alarmed to hear that a number of unprovoked acts of
violence had been carried out against British traders and other settlers. The important
difference in the nature of these rumors is that the fears of the Cherokees were
centered on their lands; theirs was a collective fear.

Carolinians feared for the

violation of the individual; fear for one’s life created a deep-rooted anxiety, which

8During Glen’s administration information was collected from a broad range o f sources, whereas his
successor William Lyttelton did not have an extensive network o f informants but mainly relied upon a
number o f military officers under his command. Hatley, Dividing Paths, 109.
9Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly, April 1750-August 1751 (Columbia, 1974)
10Clerk to the Council (1746), quoted in McDowell, “Series Preface,” in DR1A, l:v
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was both intensely personal and collective.

The investigations sent out from

Charleston suggest that the first rumors, which created the crisis, spread among the
Cherokees.
An affidavit taken from a backcountry storekeeper, Herman Geiger, of events
that happened “some time ago” indicates the difficulties the Charleston officials
faced.11 Geiger’s official statement was given in the third person, which distanced
him from the events and indicated that for the most part he was not actually present;
thus what he related was largely hearsay. He claimed, for instance, that he had heard
from “several” individuals that William Broadway, a deerskin trader, had entered the
Cherokee towns and on being asked by the Indians the common question, “What
news below[?] He replyed that the white men were raising an army to cut the Indians
all to pieces.”12
How veritable is Geiger’s statement? On the one hand, it provided plausible
answers to the agitation of the Indian Piedmont settlers. Yet “several” people had
informed Geiger of the imminent attack: who were they and could they be trusted?
Sadly, there is no way to establish answers to these questions. To further complicate
the picture, Broadway was an employee of James Francis, one of Geiger’s
competitors.

1^

It is possible that Geiger bore Francis some type of grudge and hoped

to undermine Francis’s trading ability in the Indian community by creating the
impression that Francis’s employees could not be trusted. However, if this was the
case, Geiger stood to undermine his own reputation if his account was disproved; he

1‘Affidavit o f Herman Geiger, 11 May 1751, in DR1A, 1:113-14.
12Ibid.,
13Hatley, Dividing Paths, 85.
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had after all made a damning declaration under oath. It is not clear what motivated
Broadway to respond the way he allegedly did. Perhaps after a few glasses of rum it
was his idea of a private joke, which was inadvertently heard by others and spread out
of control. Or he may have been motivated by personal gain. Indians fearful of war
would have greater needs for guns and powder, which he could offer them at inflated
prices and generate profits from such transactions. In any case, the alarm that this
outrageous rumor created illustrates the degree to which the Cherokees regarded the
news of traders. The traders were in a powerful position; they were relied on to
exchange vital goods and as representatives of the British crown.

Broadway had

abused this power and jeopardized the harmony of Cherokee-Carolinian relations.14
The same rumor of impending invasion by the Carolinians undoubtedly spread
swiftly to other towns, growing in magnitude as it traveled. The affidavit of James
Beamer who traded in the town of Tugaloo illustrates the general confusion in that
community.

Several “gangs” of Cherokees from the Lower Towns had been out

warring. One of these groups returned and announced that William Broadway had
told one of their tribesmen, “There was an army of white people, about six hundred,
coming up to take the Norward Indians for the mischief they had done to the white
people.” 15 This news was reiterated in another account that had been sent through the
nation by an Indian messenger named Jeptoe.16 The mutation of this invasion rumor
illustrates the verbal distortion that took place. The exact size of the phantom army

14David Dowey in his affidavit reported that William Broadway said, “I hear I am to be hanged,”
Dowey replied, “Indeed William if what the Indians say o f you to be true, you deserve to be severely
chastised for you have bred great disturbances.” Affidavit o f David Dowey, 25 May 1751, in DR1A,
1:57-58.
15Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 26-29.
16Ibid„ 1: 28.
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had suddenly gained importance; it had grown to six hundred. The original rumor as
it traveled had grown more specific. The attack was a response to the actions of
‘Norward Indians,’ who sporadically attacked White and Indian Piedmont villages,
including those of the Catawba and Chickasaw Indians who were allies of the South
Carolinians. A number of ‘Norward Indians’ came from New York and Pennsylvania
and spoke Iroquoian tongues, cognate to the Cherokee language, while others
scattered across Pennsylvania to the Upper Great Lakes spoke Algonquian.

17

It is

little wonder that the Indians were alarmed by the thought of six hundred Carolinians
storming their communities. Beamer’s affidavit is likely to be more reliable than
Geiger’s declaration because he understood and conversed in the native dialect,
whereas Geiger depended upon the translations of interpreters for much of his news.
Concerned for the welfare of their families, the Cherokees took the rumor seriously
and hastily made preparations to defend themselves against the enemy.
The deep fear that was generated among these people is reflected in the
“disturbances” that followed.18 Beamer reported that the Indians, driven by the
imminent arrival of a large army and propelled by the urgent need to procure supplies
of guns and powder for protection, broke into the storehouse of trader Bernard
Hughes and stole what they could. Now prepared for war they waited in anticipation,
but shortly afterwards they received news that the report of invasion had been false.
So they returned the goods they had taken from Hughes. Beamer does not indicate.
17Gregory Evans Dowd, “The Panic o f 1751: The Significance o f Rumors on the South CarolinaCherokee Frontier,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser. 53:3 (July 1996), 527-560 at 532. For
Catawba diplomacy see James H. Merrell, The Indian’s New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors
from European Contact Through the Era o f Removal (Chapel Hill, 1989) 134-66. For Iroquois
diplomacy see Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial
Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit, 1983).
18Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 26-29.
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‘who’ or ‘what’ persuaded these frightened Indians that their fears were redundant.
The rumor was resolved peacefully. Nonetheless, he was anxious to prevent “these
continual alarms from the Indians” and suggested to Governor Glen that it was
“absolutely necessary” to build a fort a mile from Keowee.19 The construction of a
fort would offer many benefits, including personal ones for the English settlers and
traders. “It will not only be of service to keep the Cherokee Indians in awe, but it
would [stop?] the warlike incursions of the Northward Indians, would be of great
service to the traders, in securing their interest, and prevent some profligate people
from taking to[o] much liberty in transgressing the laws.”

90

One other notable invasion rumor was circulated among the Cherokees in late
April 1751. This may have been a further mutation of those described by both Geiger
and Beamer. Robert Bunning, a Cherokee interpreter acting in his role as diplomatic
agent, sent word to Governor Glen of the ‘talk’ that the Raven of Hiwassee had given
in the presence of his people. The Raven explained to Bunning that the people from
Keowee and Estemorie heard from William Carr that the governor intended to send
an army to kill any Norward Indians that were found in their towns. The townspeople
panicked on hearing this news, “got it into their heads, they could not believe it was
the Norwards you intended to kill, but they themselves.”

91

Alarmed, they called a

meeting with the neighboring townspeople of Echoe and relayed the rumor. In turn,
the people of Echoe sent runners to the town of Kittawa acquainting them with the

19Keowee was the principal town o f the Lower Cherokees, situated on the Keowee River in what is
present-day Oconee County, South Carolina.
20Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 29. The terms “northward” and “norward”
Indians are used interchangeably in the sources. I use the term norward unless I am directly quoting
from the sources.
21Talk o f the Raven, 14 May 1751, in DRIA, 1: 74-77 at 74.
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disturbing news that an army had been raised to kill them. The people of Kittawa
•

•

“believed it.”

99

All three resolved to ally together and prepared for the ‘impending’

attack. The snowball effect is clear; uncertainty fuelled this rumor, which quickly
spread to neighboring towns.
In each case South Carolina had no plans to attack, but the deep fear of
conspiracy generated by these “bad talks” was serious enough to provoke what at the
•

•

9 a

time were considered to be rational responses.

Other unsettling incidences occurred

amidst this uncertainty, which created hostility among the Cherokees and made them
more suspicious of Carolinian intentions. About the same time that these invasion
rumors were circulating, Cherokee tribesmen from Tugaloo made public a crime that
had been committed against them. They estimated that 331 deerskins had been stolen
by white men from one o f their camps on the Savannah River.24 Understandably they
sought recompense for the theft of such valuable property.

The Cherokees were

unconvinced by attempts that had been made by the thieves to throw them off their
trail.

The robbers were well acquainted with Indian habits; they had covered the

ground with “small skins cutt and their dryed meat thrown on the fire” in the hopes
that the Cherokees would think that one of their native enemies was responsible for
the robbery.25
The Cherokees carried out a thorough search for their missing skins and
tracked the thieves into South Carolina. The deposition of James Francis indicates
that the Cherokees suspected two white men whom they had seen in the woods, “one
22Ibid.,
23Govemor Glen to the Cherokee Emperor, 8 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:173-174 at 173.
24Affidavit o f Charles Banks, 1 June 1751, in DRIA, 1: 23-24.
25Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 26.
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an old man with gray hair, and the other a man with humpback.” He told Broadway,
who was acting as their interpreter, the “Indians varied much in their conjectures.”
Francis claimed that he maintained good relations with the Indians by assisting them
in their quest to find the criminals and providing a search warrant so that all
suspecting places could be scrutinized.

97

Geiger disputed this and argued that Francis

did not assist the Indians in their inquiries because he was aware that they owed
James Beamer leather and claimed that their hides had been stolen so that they could
avoid repaying their debts.28 As usual, Geiger’s information was second - or third hand and thus questionable. Charles Banks confirmed that he had seen the warrant
that Francis issued and duly allowed the Indians to look at his skins; “They
acknowledged none to be theirs.”

9Q

This injustice against the Cherokees took months to resolve. It is little wonder
that in such circumstances tensions mounted and rumors flourished. The Cherokees
had incurred a substantial loss and the Carolinians appeared to be stalling for time.
The Carolinians’ tardy response did not enhance diplomatic relations but was another
reason for the Cherokees to suspect their motives and question whether they could be
trusted. The evidence suggested that Carolinians were responsible for the theft. The
Indians found pipes among the English traders, which they had packed into their
missing skins. Naturally, this discovery heightened their suspicions. Trader James
Adair had given a pipe to one of Francis’s servants.

26Deposition o f James Francis, (June 1751?), in DRIA, 1:24-26, 25.
27Ibid„
28Affidavit o f Herman Geiger, 11 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:113.
29Affidavit o f Charles Banks, 1 June 1751, in DRIA, 1: 23-24.
30Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 26.

For his part Francis could not
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be sure who was responsible for the injustice and offered a five-pound bill to anyone
91
who could give him “certain information” concerning the theft.
Rumors floated
•

from one person to another. One suggested that trader James Burgess had admitted to
stealing the skins and would do the same again if he had the opportunity.

Another

testified that Edward Turner (occupation unknown) knew who was responsible for
taking the skins and would release the information if summoned to do so.

In late

November, after thorough investigations, Governor Glen finally agreed to resolve the
matter and pay the Cherokees in full for their missing skins on the proviso that they
would first compensate Bernard Hughes for the losses he had incurred during Indian
raids at his store.34
Before Glen’s acknowledgement of English culpability, the CherokeeCarolinian alliance was close to the breaking point. Relationships with British traders
had deteriorated because the Cherokees strongly suspected that a number of them
were responsible for the missing skins, the Cherokee trading debt had mounted, and it
was likely that the traders cheated them with false weights and measures. To make
matters worse, the Lower Creeks and Lower Cherokees were at war, which proved
financially draining on the Cherokee economy. The British had not intervened, much
to the Cherokees’ annoyance, nor punished the Creeks for the hostility shown towards
their Cherokee ‘allies.’ Many native hunters who usually procured both food and
deerskins were now preoccupied with war. Cherokee agitation was symbolized in the
changing attitudes towards traders, who ultimately represented the British crown.
31Deposition o f James Francis, (June 1751?), in DRIA, 1: 25.
32Affidavit o f James Beamer, 12 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 27.
33Deposition o f James Francis, (June 1751?), in DRIA, 1:25.
34Captain Glen to the Indians, 20 November 1751, in DRIA, 1:184-87.
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The detailed affidavit of James Maxwell, a Carolina agent, illustrates that after
the ‘missing skins’ incident there appeared to be a noticeable difference in the way
the Cherokee Indians behaved towards the traders.

Ronald and Abraham Smith,

licensed traders, reported that the Cherokees were “very impudent and unusually
insolent.” Indians declared in a threatening manner that the traders should not leave
until they brought supplies of ammunition; at one point the traders thought they
would lose their lives.

While traversing the Lower Settlements, Maxwell was again

told that the Indians were “grievously insolent, and rude, and that their (the traders’)
lives were in danger.”
As Maxwell traveled from one settlement to another and spoke with groups of
traders, he received similar types of disturbing information. For instance, in the town
of Jortice, located in the Middle Settlement, the white inhabitants informed him that
“bad talks” had been sent from the Lower Settlements since the winter months. Even
Maxwell noticed a difference in their temperament; Indians who had formerly shown
kindness to him would not now look at him.

Although he tried to assuage the fears

of the traders, it became increasingly obvious that the Cherokees harbored grievances
against them. However, these negative reactions were not evident throughout the
whole nation.

Maxwell was heartened to meet Cornelius Dougherty, a principal

trader in the town of Hiwassee. Dougherty informed him that the Raven of Hiwassee
and his tribesmen took no notice of “bad talks,” although they were frequently sent
them from the Lower Towns. Samuel Benn and Robert Goudy, traders at Toquo,

35Affidavit o f James Maxwell, 12 June 1751, in DRIA, 1, 68-71 at 68.
36Ibid., 69.
37Ibid.,

46

Tellico, and Ninety-Six, did not feel threatened, perhaps because the Overhill
Cherokees sent a “strong guard” to protect them when they engaged in trade.
Breaking his journey at Joree for the night, Maxwell met a messenger who
informed him of an unsettling rumor: there were plans afoot to kill him and all the
other white settlers in the town.

Maxwell’s deposition reveals that he carefully

scrutinized this rumor. “I only laughed at [it],” he said, “as I really thought if they had
such a design they would never make it publick.”

By calmly analyzing and

dismissing this falsehood, he prevented uproar in the town and rested that evening
“without fear.”40
The following day he was confronted with additional rumors, more specific in
origin and detrimental in content. James May, a trader at Joree, came “very fast on
foot” and informed him of a Cherokee plot to kill British traders. An Indian woman
from Stecoe, a Cherokee “Out Town” on Tucosigia River, informed May that
Norward Indians had murdered Daniel Murphy, a Virginia trader.41 Further, she
notified her local Stecoe trader, Bernard Hughes, of the impending danger. “Initially
reluctant,” he abandoned his store once his attackers were in sight and fled to
Tuckaseigee, where he found refuge in Robert Bunning’s trading house.42 The
assailants broke into his store and divided up the booty.

38Deposition o f James Maxwell, 4 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:116-18 at 117.
39Ibid., 117.
40Affidavit o f James Maxwell, 12 June 1751, in DRIA, 1, 68-71.
41Hatley, Dividing Paths, 82.
42Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 26.
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authenticity of these rumors, Maxwell was nonetheless fearful that Hughes’s attackers
had caught up with him and killed him too.43
In an attempt to separate fact from fiction, Maxwell questioned the headmen
of Joree and found that they, too, had heard this news from “several messengers” and
believed it.44 Maxwell obtained assurances that the Indians of Joree would protect
him and other British settlers if they were attacked.

Yet Indian manpower was

limited and both the traders and the inhabitants of Joree feared they would not be able
to defend themselves against one hundred northern Indians.45 In the meantime, May,
seized by the rumors of death and destruction and fearing that he might suffer the
same fate as Hughes, took precautions and moved his goods and skins into the house
of the Raven of Cowee. The Raven was also swayed by the rumors and was surprised
to hear that Maxwell was so reluctant to believe them. He asked May, “Is he deaf,
won’t he hear, tell him, from me to be gone, and if he will be deaf and won’t hear, do
you go for the Talks are very bad, and tell him further not to go by the way of
Keowee, for they will kill him, nor by the way of Ninety-Six, for they will waylay
him.”46 Convinced finally by the admonitions of those he trusted together with others
who said that the reports had been confirmed by Indian women, Maxwell hastily left
and headed for Augusta with seventeen white and two black men, some of whom
were armed.

On his arrival there, he met two traders, William Veal and James

Tortooshells, who had fled from Keowee, distressed because they believed “all or the

43Deposition o f James Maxwell, 4 May 1751, in DRIA,
44Affidavit o f James Maxwell, 12 June 1751, in DRIA,
45Deposition o f James Maxwell, 4 May 1751, in DRIA,
46Affidavit o f James Maxwell, 12 June 1751, in DRIA,

1:116-118.
1, 68-71.
1:116-118.
1, 68-71.
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most part of the white men had been killed the same night.”47 On their travels they
had met John Vann, a trader on the Georgia border, who fled with his family from
Ninety-Six because he feared for their well-being.

Vann had heard that Hugh

Murphey had been “shot at through the arm” as he traveled to Coronico, “but he had
gott clear of the villains that shot him.”48 The affidavit of trader Robert Gandey
suggested that the culprit was a Cherokee from one of the Lower Towns.49
The resolution of these rumors, spread by one Indian woman and later by a
number of “wenches,” was that they ravaged the settlements, causing deep panic and
alarm. The reactions of the traders and Indian headmen illustrate that women were
powerful agents of rumor, even though they remain anonymous in the sources.50 This
rumor plot is particularly interesting because it throws a glimmer of light onto the
lives of Cherokee women, who usually remain confined to the edges of the remaining
paper record.

The woman who warned May had been as loyal as his friend the

Raven, though she was not given a name.51 Furthermore, the lowly social status of
the “wenches” who continued to spread the rumor appears to have raised few
questions regarding its reliability. Perhaps this was because sexual freedom was
accepted in Cherokee society. The European notion of sexual freedom was that it
degraded women and jeopardized civic order.

However, Cherokee women

controlled their own sexuality. Unmarried women were permitted to engage in sexual

47Deposition o f James Maxwell, 4 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:116-118
48Ibid., 118.
49Affidavit o f Robert Gandey, 5 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:71.
50A number o f Cherokee women became wives o f traders; intermarriage illustrates that the British
trusted them. It is probable that the trader James Adair married a Cherokee woman and had children by
her. Perdue, Cherokee Women, 81-82, 198.
51Hatley, Dividing Paths, 53
52Perdue, Cherokee Women, 191.
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relations with any man, providing they did not violate incest taboos with members of
their own clans or the clans of their fathers.53 James Adair astutely noted that even
married women were granted “Full liberty to plant their (men’s) brows with horns as
oft as they please, without fear of punishment.”54 These “wenches” were loyal to the
British cause and informed the traders that they were in danger; their personal
friendships and possible sexual liaisons with local traders may have been a motivating
factor.55 The women may also have felt a sense of responsibility for the well-being of
the community. They relied upon European goods particularly, cloth, kettles, hoes,
and blades. If the traders escaped unharmed, it was likely that they would return once
the unrest subsided, whereas the death of the traders would seriously disrupt the local
economy and discourage other traders from settling in the same place.
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to detach some fantasies from the
facts and establish how these rumors were resolved. In the first instance, the
numerous reports that “Poor Daniel Murphey’s being unfortunately killed” was
“false;” Anthony Dean verified that he was alive.56 However, Beamer’s letter to
Glen, along with council reports, indicate that northern Indians killed Murphey the
following spring.

Second, northern Indians did plunder Hughes’s storehouse, but he

escaped unharmed, contrary to the reports made by John Bryant and William

53Ibid., 56.
54Ibid.,
55Friendship was also a reason for warning settlers o f impending attacks. Ann Matthews, a colonist in
Carolina, recalled in her memoir that an unnamed Cherokee woman warned backcountry settlers o f an
enemy attack because she “disliked very much to think that the white women who had been so good to
her in giving her clothes and bread and butter in trading parties would be killed.” Anne Matthews,
“Memoir,” 2, typescript in the South Carolina Library, Columbia, quoted in Hatley, Dividing Paths,
89-90.
56Letter from Anthony Dean to Cornelius Doherty, 1 May 1751,in DRIA, 1:72.
57Hatley, Dividing Paths, 53.
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Thomson, who suggested that he was one of four traders to lose their lives.58 It was
later reported that “not one white man was killed.”59 The Stocoes admitted to looting
Hughes’s storehouse; they had been provoked by “a lying talk from Keowee” and
“their dogs, and their hoggs, and themselves run mad.”60 Finally, Hugh Murphey was
shot and “very much disabled.” Skiagunta reported to Glen that Norward Indians,
“the Twightwees, Taghwas, and Nanteyas” were responsible for this action.61 This
contradicted the earlier rumor suggesting that a Lower Cherokee was culpable. 62
There was an element of truth in each of these rumors, but as they circulated they
became intertwined with one another and it appeared to the traders that each of these
isolated events formed an integral part of a larger plot to kill them. In their attempts
to make sense of the confusing events around them, they looked to one another for
support and leadership, but rumor like an infection had tainted their sense of well
being. The actions of the Cherokees spoke louder than any words of consolation and
the traders fled.
Traders were not alone in seeking refuge from real and imagined dangers.
Farmers and other frontier inhabitants and their families decided, albeit reluctantly,
that leaving their settlements was the best way to resolve the difficulties they faced.
James Francis reported from Saluda that Norward Indians were particularly
menacing: they “openly threaten white as well as red people.”

The townspeople

there took steps to fortify themselves in the event of invasion, which they believed a
58Deposition o f John Bryant, 4 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:41, Affidavit o f William Thomson, (date
unknown), in DRIA, 1:51.
59John Gray to Governor Glen, 22 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:59.
60Talk o f the Raven, 14 May 1751, in DRIA, 1: 74.
61Talk o f the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, 15 November 1751, in DRIA, 1: 178-184 at 180.
“ Affidavit o f Robert Gandey, 5 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:71
63James Francis to Governor Glen, 14 May 1751, in DRIA, 1: 63.
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serious possibility.

The number of violent rumors that circulated throughout the

nation undoubtedly encouraged individuals to flee from their familiar surroundings.
Particularly disturbing was the affidavit given by Mary Gould, a German immigrant,
to a justice of the peace in Saxagotha. Her family’s kindness towards the Shawnee
Indians was repaid with extreme violence and terrible suffering. The Indians had
been welcomed as houseguests, given food and tobacco, and permitted to stay
overnight. The next morning they “shot my husband through the head, [they] struck
me with a tamhook under my right arm...and killed both my children...then they
plundered the house of all that was valuable.”64 Later in June, trader John Hamilton
reported, “The talk of the Indians has put us to great confusion and has been the cause
of the building of three forts. One of the three is very defensive, and will be when
finished perhaps one of the best in the country.”65
Captain Alexander Rattray reported similar resolutions amongst settlers who
lived along the Wateree River. Many left their homes and sought refuge in forts
while others fled from the area. “Nothing was expected but an open war.” Fearing
attacks from hostile Indians, parties of men rotated reaping and guarding their corn
crops.66 The Nottoway Indians who had allied with the Iroquois also proved to be
menacing.

fkl

They were warring against the Catawbas and passed through white

settlements to reach their rivals’ territory. Asahquah, the headman of the Nottoways,
said that his men came “after our own colour and not after white people.” However,
they were annoyed by the settlers’ attempts to “intermeddle” in their military tactics.
64Affidavit o f Mary Gould, 8 May 1751, in DRIA, 1:126-127.
“ Letter from James Hamelton to George Hunter, 4 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:83.
66James Beamer to Richard Lambton, 10 May 1751, in DRIA, 1: 65.
67Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 97.

The Nottoways accused the settlers of alerting the Catawbas of their approach. In
retaliation they killed cattle as they passed through English settlements, while others
in their group deliberately destroyed crops.
The extreme defensive measures of the settlers indicate the degree to which
rumor had gripped Carolinian communities. Fearing that there would be no other
resolution to these isolated Indian attacks except war, the settlers planned
accordingly.

They had good reason, since the rumors regarding violence were

interspersed with others concerning Cherokee intrigues with the French and ‘Negro’
slaves. Trader Robert Gandey declared that the Little Carpenter, a Cherokee Indian
who had been captured by the French and lived among them for a number of years,
was responsible for ‘bad talks’ and for rounding up a French commission.69
Furthermore, the Raven of Hiwassee admitted that “I have heard that the French
•

encourage their Indians to kill white people, and also those of our nation.”

70

Glen

blamed the Cherokees for permitting the French to enter their territories and
“destroying our good friends.” He also declared that a number of Cherokees had
“aided and assisted” the French on their expeditions by providing them with
ammunition which they had used to kill settlers’ cattle.
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•

By cleverly releasing these

rumors of a possible Cherokee-French alliance, the Cherokees played on one of
Carolina’s greatest fears and reminded the South Carolinians of the strategic
importance of the Cherokees in defending the colony.

68Talk o f the Notowaga Indians, (no date) in DRIA, 1:47.
69Affidavit o f Robert Gandey, 5 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:71.
70The Little Carpenter was known by Cherokee Indians as Attakullakulla. Talk o f the Cherokee
Indians to Governor Glen, 14 November 1751, in DRIA, 1:175-178 at 177.
71Ibid, 1: 178.
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Rumors of Cherokees corrupting ‘Negro’ slaves who belonged to English
settlers by inciting them to run away were also disturbing. Trader Edmund Grey
reported that “a half-breed fellow did seduce six of my Negroes to run away from me
to the Cherokees, from whence he promised to conduct them to some place where
they might depend for their freedom...(the fellow) ought to be proceeded against, as
an incendiary and disturber of the publick safety.”
returned.

7T

79

Only three of his slaves

The old warrior of Keowee told Indian trader Richard Smith that he had

been approached by a number of Negroes who told him “that there was in all
plantations many Negroes more than white people, and that for the sake of liberty
they would join them.”74 These rumors indicated that the Cherokees sought to
diminish the strength of English settlers by encouraging the French to join Cherokee
raiding parties and by causing internal division and distrust by inciting the slaves to
leave their masters.
Naturally, Glen was perturbed by these rumors and the response of the settlers
who left their homes; ultimately he feared that fleeing Carolinians would lose the
strongholds they had made because Indians might reclaim the land in their absence.
Moreover, the disorder and panic did not bode well for the success of his Indian
policy. He was under pressure from the committeemen in the Upper and Lower
Assembly houses to restore order; thus he urgently needed to find solutions to these
escalating problems.

In the first instance, the houses raised troops to protect the

colony. Glen appointed John Fairchild, who was responsible for raising a group of
72Edmund Gray to John Fallowfield, 15 May 1751,in DRIA, 1: 83.
73The other runaways spread invasion rumors among the Cherokees. Deposition o f Richard Smith, 12
July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 101-103 at 103.
74Ibid., 103.
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rangers, to patrol the borderlands. Glen urged his officers to “assure the settlers that
nothing shall be admitted by this government, that may tend to their safety.”

By

carefully scrutinizing the areas from which settlers had fled, Glen realized that if the
Catawba and Norward tribes were reconciled, many of the threats to the settlers
would dissipate.

Using his diplomatic skills, Glen not only convinced the

representatives of the Upper and Lower assemblies to plough money into this project
but also persuaded the Catawbas to meet for peace talks with the Six Nations in New
York.76 Glen’s role as mediator was made easier due to the damaging consequences
of Norward raids that were inflicted upon Catawba property. 77
These initial actions taken by Glen did reduce the numbers of Norward
Indians traveling through the Carolina backcountry, but more was needed to restore
order to the troubled, rumor-laden colony. The two houses of assembly demanded
that Glen impose a trade embargo on the Indians. The committeemen believed that
this would bring the Indians to their senses and peace would once more be restored.
Glen was reluctant to carry out this proposal; he argued that it required “the most
serious consideration” and feared that such action would ignite further hostility. 78
Such an embargo would have serious effects on all Cherokees, even those who had
played no part in disturbances of the peace and who had remained loyal to the British
cause, such as The Raven of Hiwassee. Glen also feared that such actions would
provoke an alliance with the French, “who have been long counting their

75Govemor Glen to John Fairchild, (date unknown) in DRIA, 1, 49.
76Merrell, The Indians ’New World, 155-60, see also Affidavit o f William Thomson, in DRIA, 1:51.
77Ibid., 159.
78Govemor Glen to the Committee on Indian Affairs, (Date unknown), in DRIA, 1: 52.
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friendship.”79 By June, however, Glen’s reluctance had dissipated. The increasing
number of affidavits and letters he received suggested that the panic had worsened.

OA

Glen wrote to the President and Council of Georgia informing them that he was
“sending a sufficient force against (the Cherokees) to puni[sh] the guilty” and
requested that Georgia comply with the trade embargo.

01

Glen resolved in his mission to “demand satisfaction for the insolent and
audacious behavior” of the Indians, communicated with the traders, and insisted they
withdraw from the nation.

Unfortunately for the Indians, the departure of the

traders coincided with the beginning of the hunting season, when local traders usually
provided items on credit.

0*5

They were sorely missed. Robert Bunning, interpreting a

talk given by the headsmen of Tacite, Tellico, and Cheoah, reported that “It is of great
trouble to them now to see the white people’s houses empty in this nation, they used
to be full of goods... We long and mourn to see our traders among us.”

The towns

of Keowee and Estanarie responded by abandoning their villages and retreating into
the hills. Captain John Fairchild noted that they were “destroying their own com
fields by way of fat’ning their horses as if for some journey.”

a*

It came to Glen’s

attention that in the early summer a number of headmen made attempts to carry out
negotiations with him. However, on setting out they met a messenger who informed
them that the Creeks had declared war on them and were joined by a thousand white

79Ibid.,
80This can be seen from the evidence used in this chapter.
81Govemor Glen to the President and Council o f Georgia, 15 June 1751, in DRIA, 1:170-72 at 171.
82Ibid.,
83Perdue, Cherokee Women, 78.
84Talk ofTasitte ofEuphassee and others, 30 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 107-108 at 108.
85Captain Fairchild to Governor Glen, August 24, 1751, in DRIA, 1: 121-22.
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men who intended to intercept them on their way down to Charleston.

or

Naturally,

the Cherokees turned back and rushed to their villages for protection. The breakdown
in friendly trade relations, symbolized by the trade embargo and the departure of
many traders from Cherokee communities, left Indians uncertain of the intentions of
those at Charleston. The rumor of attack was plausible and therefore taken seriously.
As the

summer months wore on, a number of leaders including

Ammouiscositte of Tellico and the Tacite of Hiawassee were reluctant to visit
Charleston because of the fear of disease and consequent death. Bunning reported
that “The air from the Congarees down is very unhealthy, and the sickness in town
proved very fatal to many of their people.”

0*7

After a discussion with a number of

traders, he commented in November that “The nation in our time has been greater
than at present. We remember since there were six thousand stout men in it. They
are now not half.”88
It became clear that the only satisfactory way to bring an end to the disorder
and hostility that engulfed the Cherokee-Carolina border was to control the
dissemination of rumor.

Establishing the source of a rumor made it possible to

understand the motivational aspects that had driven an individual to spread hearsay.
However, this was an exceptionally complex task not least because it was so difficult
to confirm who had started a rumor. In chirographic cultures rumors can sometimes
be traced back to one source; at least there might be a paper trail to follow. In oral
societies verbal words vanished as soon as they were enunciated.

Obviously the

86Talk o f the Head Men o f Chotee and Tanacy, in DRIA, 1: 100.
87Talk o f Tasitte o f Euphassee and others, 30 July 1751, in DRIA, 1: 107-108.
88Bunning had spoken with Doherty, Beamer and Grant. Memorial o f Robert Bunning and Others, 22
November 1751, in DRIA, 1: 148.
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transmission of rumor relied upon the repetition of a particular idea, but the author of
that idea was more easily distanced from it.

Then as now, there was no single

foolproof way of verifying which individuals created rumors. Even the affidavits and
depositions taken under oath contradicted one another.
Nonetheless, Glen had his suspicions. At the top of his list of suspects were
the traders, for a number of reasons. In their attempts to making a living, they might
have sacrificed honesty and integrity and spread rumors along their “trader
grapevine” to increase profits.89

This may have been what motivated William

Broadway to spread outrageous invasion rumors. The life of a trader was difficult.
Some traders, including Cornelius Doherty, were plagued by debt.90 Traders had
close reciprocal ties to the Indian communities they supplied; they spoke their
languages and were the only British subjects able to converse freely with them. Their
role as diplomatic agents was very important; they spoke and traded with Indians on a
regular basis. Sometimes traders relied upon Indians for advice and protection, as
James May did with the Raven of Cowee. Glen was unable to prosecute any of the
traders because of his and their reliance on hearsay combined with his lack of
concrete evidence. His frustration can be seen from a declaration to the Cherokees in
November 1751: “Sometimes traders write letters which we do not know how to
believe.”91
Nonetheless, he did take steps to regulate the dissemination of information.
The scheme for regulating the Indian trade was an attempt to confine traders to

89Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 138.
90Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 139.
91Talk o f the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, 15 November 1751, in DRIA, 1: 178-184 at 181.
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operate in designated areas, with the idea that rumors would not be disseminated so
easily because traders ‘in theory’ would not transgress the boundaries of their
licenses.92 The rules set out in this scheme were quite strict. The traders were not
permitted to sell alcohol to Indians because of its harmful effects, nor were they
permitted to take “Negroes” with them as companions as colonial officials feared that
•

they would spread unsubstantiated information.

O'!

.

In December 1751, an ordinance

for regulating the Cherokee trade specifically stated that no trader should “presume to
talk to any Indian, of matters relating to the state or government without leave.”94
These regulations struck at the core of some of the worst abuses, yet it is
questionable how successful the government was in monitoring the actions of the
traders and how willing the traders were to obey such regulations. Traders lived and
worked among the Indians; conversation was their passport to carry out bartering
which helped them to live on a day-to-day basis.

A number of clauses in the

ordinance were suitably vague: what did ‘all matters of state and government’ refer
to? Ultimately, individual interpretation depended upon how much information the
traders relayed to the Indians. The ordinance served as a warning from the colonial
governor.
In due course the crisis of 1751 was resolved through a combination of
diplomatic tactics and peace negotiations. These efforts culminated in an exchange of

92Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee Trade, 3 December 1751, in DRIA, 1: 198-200 at 199.
93Scheme for regulating the Indian Trade, in DRIA, 1: 86-89 at 88.
94Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee trade, 3 December 1751, in DRIA, 1: 198-200 at 199.
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gifts and a treaty signed on 29 November 1751.95 For their part the Indians promised
“that they will not listen or give any ear to bad talks, whether they are brought to
them by Indians or white men, and least that they will not give credit to them but will
seize and detain the person bringing them until they acquaint the governor and
receive his directions...And the governor promises that he will not give absolute
credit to the letters that be wrote to him or others concerning the behaviour of the
Indians till such time as he has sent to them to enquire to the truth.”96
Slowly a fragile peace returned to the nation. But the foundations of peace
were shaky because larger political, social, and economic issues that were
transforming Cherokee society had not been addressed. The arrival of increasing
numbers of settlers into the backcountry threatened to disrupt the fragile Indian
economy and to dislocate the livelihoods o f local Indians, which revolved around
hunting.

07

The visual changes that the settlers made to the Indian landscape, which

included log cabins, roads, and fenced fields of cows were like “a powerful acid that
ate away the Indians’ world.”

QO

The Indians found a number of these changes

offensive and on occasion attempted to obliterate them.99 It is little wonder, then, that
settlers were not always greeted in the friendliest terms.

During this period of

European expansionism, “a choking cloud of contention settled over the piedmont as

95Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 30-34. See also Governor Glen’s Talk to the Cherokee Indians, 22
November 1751, in DRIA, 1:148, 184; Talk o f Governor Glen to Cherokees, 28 November 1751, in
DRIA, 1: 196.
96Talk o f Governor Glen to the Cherokees concerning their Treaty, 26 November 1751, in DRIA, 1.
187-196 at 192.
97See James Axtell, The Indians ’ New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast (Louisiana,
1997), Chapter 2.
98Merrell, The Indians ’ New World, 182.
"Ibid., 183.
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natives wrestled colonists for control of the land.”100 Settlers and Indians began to
compete for the same natural resources, which were in shorter supply due to the
increase in the population.

With each side claiming sovereignty of ‘their’ land,

disputes were often protracted and compromise difficult to ascertain.
Ultimately, the crisis of 1751 was resolved. The rumors dissipated as quickly
as they had circulated. But it would not be long before the blackbirds of rumor took
wing again. This time, though, the magnitude of the rumors they unleashed would
lead to the bitter and bloody War of 1760-61.

100Ibid., 182.

Conclusion

Rumor is a pipe
Blown by surmises, jealousies, conjectures,
And of so easy and so plain a stop
That the blunt monster with uncounted heads,
The still-discordant wavering multitude,
Can play upon it.1
In a similar vein to Virgil with his female bird-like monster and her vociferous
tongues, Shakespeare captured the diverse and ephemeral nature of rumor.

The

metaphorical use of a pipe blown by surmises, jealousies and conjectures clearly
indicates that the instigators of rumor were motivated on numerous grounds to spread
outright lies and half-truths. Some were provoked by self-gain, others tried through
the promulgation of rumor to rouse their communities to rise up and stand united as
one cohesive group, and perhaps a small number of rumors originated due to
boredom.

In any case, it is clear that rumors divided communities, both fellow

kinsmen who under normal circumstances were on friendly terms and others who
were perceived as the common enemy.
It is clear that within primary oral cultures information was a valued
commodity.

It is evident in the documents that there was a deep desire between

1 William Shakespeare, King Henry IV, as cited in Ralph L. Rosnow and Gary A. Fine, Rumor and
Gossip: The Social Psychology o f Hearsay (New York, 1976), 21.
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individuals to exchange news which was an integral part of regular social intercourse
and is all the more logical given the unwieldy terrain and long distances between
Cherokee settlements. It was not uncommon for Indians to ask traders who entered
their towns, ‘What news?’2 Driven by a mixture of curiosity and concern, individuals
were anxious to hear about events that had been occurring in nearby towns, including
the movements of tribesmen in their own community.

William Broadway’s

revelation of an impending attack was taken seriously because there was no
immediate way to clarify what turned out to be a scurrilous rumor. Whilst it may
have seemed unlikely there was still a possibility that it could be true and therefore
the Indians were forced to take necessary precautions. At the same time small groups
of tribesmen might speculate what had been going on, in the absence of news from
trusted channels, and this too could encourage rumormongering.
The wagging tongues of rumor appear to have affected all those who heard
them; rumor did not discriminate against age, race or gender. Women were just as
likely as men to convey to others what they had heard and interpreters and traders
could sometimes play an unwitting role in the dissemination of half-truths and
outright lies. It appears that each group was motivated to spread rumors for different
reasons. Perhaps the Cherokee women who had heard of a plot to kill British traders
were genuinely concerned about the well being of their communities and therefore
passed it in the hope that disaster could be averted. Had the traders been killed, they
would not only have lost their friendship but perhaps they thought it would be less
likely that new traders would set up in their community because of the recent violence
2Raymond Firth indicates that he was asked on a daily basis the same type o f question, “Rumor in a
Primitive Society,” Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53 (1956), 122-32 at 123.
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against British subjects. Interpreters were driven by financial motives, it was in their
interest to ensure that they did not deliberately misinterpret or distort what had been
enunciated to them otherwise they would fall from their distinguished positions. On
the other hand, the dissemination of scurrilous rumors could prove profitable; often it
was essential to hold council meetings to resolve the misunderstandings, which had
been created by unsubstantiated information.

Similarly traders wielded a double-

edged sword. The dissemination of false, aggressive rumors might boost the sale of
guns and powder, but in the long term discovery could lead to loss of respect within
Indian communities and ones livelihood.
Rumor traveled wherever conditions were propitious, as it journeyed over
inhabitants who were anxious it became distorted by individual judgments and fears.
Sometimes what had started out as a small tidbit of hearsay had the potential to grow
out of control. The larger the rumor, the more difficult it was to eradicate. The crisis
of 1751 took nine months to bring under control and that was after lengthy diplomatic
negotiations on the part of both parties.

Rumors became superfluous once the

tensions that had given them life died out completely or at least had been temporarily
smoothed over. Usually the demise of a rumor required an affirmation from the
enemy declaring that there was no truth in the hearsay that had been spread.
Although the rumor of impending invasion that Broadway appears to have started was
rebuked, serious damage was done, not only had a trader’s store been raided but the
speed with which the rumor traveled and mutated as it reached other settlements
caused great anxiety for those that heard it. Only occasionally rumors died a natural
death, they evaporated out of earshot because those who had given them credence
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grew weary of them or negotiated a compromise. For instance in the case of the
missing deerskins, governor Glen agreed to dispel the bad feeling that the rumor had
caused by reaching a financial settlement.
Perhaps the most essential ingredient required for the demise of rumors was
group perseverance. The panic of 1751 subsided because each side accepted their
misunderstandings and agreed to reconcile their differences. But the causes of these
disagreements lay underneath the surface waiting for the opportune moment to erupt
into life again.

The distinctive motives o f the Cherokees and the British settlers

ensured that the malicious birds of rumor would rear their heads again and take to
wing.

Bibliography
Primary Collections
McDowell, Jr., William L. ed., Colonial Records o f South Carolina: Documents
Relating to Indian Affairs, May 21 1750 - August 7 1 754, 2 vols. Columbia: South
Carolina Archives Department, 1958.
_______________________ ed., Journals o f the Commissioners o f the Indian Trade,
September 20, 1710-August 29, 1718. Columbia: South Carolina Archives Dept.,
1955.
Mereness, Newton D. ed., Travels in the American Colonies. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1916.
Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly, April 1750-August 1751. Columbia:
Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1951.

Secondary Sources
Allport, Gordon W. and Postman, Leo. The Psychology o f Rumor. New York: H.
Holt and Company, 1947.
Aquila, Richard. The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial
Frontier, 1701-1754. Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1983.
Axtell, James. The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial
North America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
____________ ed., The Indian Peoples o f Eastern America: A Documentary History o f
The Sexes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
____________ . The Invasion Within: The Context o f Culture in Colonial North
America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
____________ . After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North
America New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
____________ . White Indians o f Colonial America. Fairfield, Wash. : Ye Galleon
Press, 1991.
____________ . The Indians ’New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

65

66

____________ . “Babel of Tongues: Communicating with the Indians in Eastern
North America,” in Gray, Edward G. and Fieiring, Norman, eds., The Language
Encounter in the Americas, 1492 to 1800. Providence and New York: Berghahn
Books, 2000, 15-60.
Bloch, Marc. The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam. New York: Vintage Books,
1953.
Burt, Jesse C. and Ferguson, Robert B. Indians o f the Southeast: Then and Now.
Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1973.
Chapman, J. Milling. Red Carolinians. Columbia: S.C., University of South
Carolina Press, 1969.
Corkran, David H. The Carolina Indian Frontier. Columbia: S.C., University of
South Carolina Press, 1970.
_______________.The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival 1740-1762. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1962.
Crane, Vemer W. The Southern Frontier 1670-1732. New York; London: Norton,
1981.
Davis, Natalie Zemon. Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in
Sixteenth-Century France. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987.
Dowd, Gregory Evans “The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South
Carolina-Cherokee Frontier,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser. 53:3 (July 1996),
527-560.
Firth, Raymond. “Rumor in a Primitive Society,” Journal o f Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 53 (1956), 122-32.
Goody, Jack. The Domestication o f the Savage Mind.
University Press, 1977.

Cambridge: Cambridge

Elagedorn, Nancy L. “‘A Friend To Go Between Them:’ The Interpreter as Cultural
Broker During Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-70,” Ethnohistory, 1988, 35 (1): 60-80
______________ . ‘Faithful, Knowing, and Prudent’: Andrew Montour as Interpreter
and Cultural Broker, 1740-1772,” in Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural
Broker, Margaret Connell Szasz, ed., (Norman, 1994), 44-60.
______________ . “Brokers of Understanding: Interpreters as Agents of Cultural
Exchange in Colonial New York,” New York History 1995, 76 (4): 379-408.

67

Hatley, M. Thomas. The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through
the Era o f the Revolution. New York: Oxford Universality Press, 1993.
Johnson, Michael. The Native Tribes o f North America: A Concise Encyclopedia.
New York; Macmillan; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1994.
King, Duane H. The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled History. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1979.
Merrell, James H. The Indian’s New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from
European Contact Through the Era o f Removal. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1989.
______________ . Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania
Frontier. New York: Norton, 1999.
Ogden, C.K. and Richards, I. A., eds., The Meaning o f Meaning: A Study o f the
Influence o f Language upon Thought and o f the Science o f Symbolism. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945.
Ong, Walter J. The Presence o f the Word; Some Prolegomena for Cultural and
Religious History. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967.
_____________ . Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing o f the Word. New York,
London: Methuen, 1982.
Patterson, Lotsee and Snodgrass, Mary Ellen. Indian Terms o f the Americas.
Engelwood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, 1994.
Peckham, Howard H. Pontiac and the Indian Uprising. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1947.
Perdue, Theda. Cherokee Women: Gender and Cultural Change, 1700-1835.
Lincoln, (Nebraska): University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Richter, Daniel K. The Ordeal o f the Longhouse: The Peoples o f the Iroquois League
in the Era o f European Colonization. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1992.
_______________ .and Merrell, James eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The
Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800. Syracuse, N.Y. :
Syracuse University Press, 1987.

68

Rosnow, Ralph L. and Fine, Gary A. Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology o f
Hearsay. New York: Elsevier, 1976.
Shibutani, Tamotsu. Improvised News: A Sociological Study o f Rumor. Indianapolis,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1966
Sirmans, Marion Eugene. Colonial South Carolina: a Political History, 1663-1763.
Chapel Hill, the University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
Spacks, Patricia M. Gossip. New York: Knopf, 1985.
Waddell, Gene.
Indians in the South Carolinian Lowcountry,
Spartanburg, South Carolina, University of South Carolina, 1975.

1562-1751.

Wood, Peter H., Waselkov, Gregory A., Hatley, M. Thomas., eds., Powhatan’s
Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1989.

VITA

Marion Allison Cail

Bom in London, England, January 4, 1977. Secondary education successfully
completed, in June 1995, at St. Augustine’s Priory in Ealing, London, where she was
Head Girl in her final year. Received a Master of Arts degree with honors in Modem
History from the University of St. Andrews in June 1999. Awarded the St. Andrews’
Scholarship to study at The College of William and Mary.
In August 1999, the author entered the one-year Master of Arts program in the
History Department of the College o f William and Mary and specialized in American
History.

